G7 and China are competing to define global governance

THE near-simultaneous release of the Group of Seven Evian statements and China’s white paper on global governance marks a revealing moment in international politics.

China and the G7 are increasingly competing not only over policy choices, but also the narrative to define what the world’s problems are, which institutions should address them, and whose priorities should shape the solutions.

At Evian, G7 leaders adopted nine statements covering the realms of geopolitics, global economic growth, critical minerals, development partnerships, digital safety, health, migration and transnational crime.

Together, they consolidate a governance narrative built around resilience, rules, macroeconomic balance, secure supply chains and trusted partnerships. 

The statements were largely motivated by concerns over persistent global imbalances, non-market policies, structural overcapacity and cross-border spillovers – which reflected a wider debate over China’s growth model and industrial policy.

In particular, the focus on reducing dependence on single suppliers, especially in rare earths and permanent magnets, pointed to China’s strategic role in global processing and supply chains.

The G7 did not frame this as a call for wholesale separation.

Its language was more institutional and managerial: identify vulnerabilities, reduce excessive dependencies, monitor imbalances, strengthen domestic growth, and coordinate through bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Group of 20. 

China’s white paper, More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals and Actions, offered a different diagnosis.

It placed the stresses of the current geoeconomic milieu not on dependency or overcapacity, but on unilateralism, protectionism, hegemonism, bloc politics and the underrepresentation of the Global South. 

And the answer to that, indicated the report, was sovereign equality, international rule of law, true multilateralism, people-centred development and practical action, organised around the United Nations.

Additionally, China’s paper positioned the country as a provider of global public goods through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative and the Global Governance Initiative – frameworks proposed by Beijing. 

In this narrative, China is not primarily a source of systemic imbalance, but a participant in reforming a governance system that Beijing argues does not yet reflect the weight and needs of developing countries.

Yet, the contrast should not be reduced to a black-and-white divide between the ideals of the G7 and China. 

The G7, for instance, is also trying to speak for developing countries, as seen in partnership frameworks such as the Pact for Prosperity, People and the Planet, the Africa Forward Summit and Global Gateway.

The group’s message is that resilience, private investment, development finance and infrastructure partnerships in the Global South can support growth while reducing vulnerability.

For its part, China is, like the G7, emphasising the importance of resilience. Beijing has sought to stop relying on external suppliers for semiconductors, including Nvidia chips, by accelerating domestic manufacturing capacity and strengthening local supply chains. 

A matter of definitions

Both sides, therefore, care about resilience, development, multilateralism and stability. The competition lies in how these terms are defined, which institutions should operationalise them, and whose priorities should guide implementation.

This pattern has been developing for several years. In 2021, the US-led Summit for Democracy was accompanied by China’s white paper China: Democracy that Works and a Chinese report on the state of democracy in the US. The issue then was who could define what “democracy” meant. 

In 2023, amid the Ukraine war and renewed Western emphasis on rules-based security, China released the Global Security Initiative Concept Paper and its position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. 

As artificial intelligence developments accelerated, the US released Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan in 2025, framing AI as a race for global dominance.

China followed by publishing its Global AI Governance Action Plan the same year, positioning AI as a public good with a capacity-building agenda.

The tussle between the 2026 G7 statements and China’s white paper is broader. Earlier contests focused on democracy, security or AI. This one elevates the competition to global governance itself. 

It asks how vulnerability, representation, development and security should be balanced; whether solutions should be built mainly through G7-led coalitions and expert agencies or through UN-centred and Global South-oriented mechanisms; and whether global order should prioritise risk reduction, institutional reform, or some combination of both.

Neither narrative is merely rhetorical. They shape policy. The G7’s language may feed into critical mineral alliances, diversification laws, trade defence tools, IMF and OECD oversight, development finance coordination and AI governance standards. 

China’s vocabulary may influence UN-affiliated initiatives, South-South capacity building, Brics and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation partnerships, AI platforms and new forums for global governance reform.

Asia caught in the middle

For Asia, this matters directly because the region sits at the intersection of both frameworks. 

Japan and South Korea have a close relationship with the US on security and technology networks, but remain deeply exposed to Chinese manufacturing, markets and supply chains.

Asean wants investment, infrastructure and digital growth, but does not want supply chain diversification to the region to become a new form of bloc politics.

India benefits from Western interest in supply chain relocation and technology partnerships, but also presents itself as a voice of the Global South. 

Asian economies therefore face a practical rather than ideological challenge.

They want resilient supply chains without losing market openness, development finance without unsustainable debt, and technological access while retaining control over infrastructure, data security and regulation.

The region benefits from Chinese manufacturing scale, but some also face competitive pressure from Chinese industrial capacity. They welcome G7 financing and standards, but may resist being treated mainly as sites for de-risking.

That is why the Global South is central to both the G7 and China. The former increasingly presents its agenda in terms of mutually beneficial partnerships, resilient value chains and support for vulnerable economies.

China pushes forth its agenda in terms of development rights, sovereign equality and greater representation for developing countries.

The audience is not only Beijing, Washington, Brussels or Tokyo, but also Jakarta, New Delhi, Riyadh, Nairobi and Brasilia.

The risk is that narrative competition hardens into institutional fragmentation.

If every issue is sorted into rival vocabularies – resilience versus representation, de-risking versus development, security versus inclusion – practical cooperation becomes harder even when interests overlap.

Climate finance, pandemic preparedness, AI safety, food security, debt management and critical mineral transparency all require some degree of common language.

A more stable global governance system would need a language free from zero-sum games.

The G7’s concerns over risk, supply chains and imbalances respond to real pressures in the global economy. China’s promulgation of development, equality and institutional representation responds to real frustrations among many developing countries.

The significance of the Evian statements and China’s white paper lies less in immediate policy outcomes than in the political direction they reveal. The contest over global governance is increasingly a contest over definition. 

The next phase will not be shaped only by who has more power, but also by who can more persuasively explain what global governance is for – and who can deliver practical benefits to the countries asked to support that vision.

The writer is a research fellow with the Charhar Institute