Who should pay for Singapore’s cross-border power links?
Public support should reflect measurable shared benefits without shifting controllable risks to consumers
WHO should pay for an electricity connection that serves commercial buyers and may also benefit the wider power system?
This question gained urgency at Singapore International Energy Week (SIEW) in late October. At the SIEW Thinktank Roundtable, Jennifer Tay, a partner at consultancy Baringa, cautioned against expecting large electricity users alone to finance infrastructure delivering broader public benefits.
Preliminary findings from a Singapore-US feasibility study on regional energy connectivity presented on Oct 28 highlighted the need for new financial models – including shared ownership and guarantees – to make the massive investments viable.
As Singapore advances its regional electricity import plans, broader support may be justified. The decision should pass four tests: additional benefits, identifiable beneficiaries, existing remuneration and control of risk.
From electricity imports to cost allocation
Singapore’s electricity needs are expanding. The Energy Market Authority (EMA) reported peak demand of 8.6 gigawatts (GW) in August 2026, potentially reaching 9.9 to 13 GW by 2031.
EMA has granted conditional approvals for 900 megawatts of electricity imports from Peninsular Malaysia.
Separately, feasibility studies are under way for a second Singapore-Malaysia interconnection, potentially providing up to 2 GW of capacity by 2030.
These are distinct developments, neither of which guarantees delivery. They nevertheless illustrate why Singapore must distinguish the commercial value of imported electricity from the wider benefits of the infrastructure carrying it.
A long-term power purchase agreement can support generation and associated transmission arrangements. Yet, a connection may also provide flexibility, access to future suppliers or benefits extending beyond the original buyer.
Those possibilities warrant examination. They do not automatically establish a need for additional public funding. The following tests should apply.
- First, demonstrate additional benefits
What does a proposed connection deliver beyond the best realistic alternative?
Consider the second Malaysia-Singapore interconnection. Would it provide access to additional suppliers, improve reliability or increase flexibility beyond what existing infrastructure and other investments could achieve?
These benefits are plausible, but their magnitude requires assessment. The assessment should also include any additional backup and network costs.
The comparison must account for costs, delivery schedules, technical constraints and alternative investments. A connection may appear valuable against a scenario of inaction while offering less additional value compared with another feasible solution.
Any broader contribution should be justified by those net additional benefits, alongside the demonstrated funding need.
Notably, while the exact value of preventing a future blackout cannot be perfectly calculated, the strategic rationale for treating the grid as a public good should be transparently communicated.
- Second, identify the beneficiaries
A few major buyers may be needed to get a grid project off the ground in the first place. From there, who actually gains?
An industrial buyer benefits from contracted electricity. Singapore’s wider power system might gain flexibility or improved security of supply. Future customers could benefit from infrastructure initially developed for someone else. Exporting and transit countries may receive separate advantages.
These groups are not interchangeable.
If a connection demonstrably improves reliability for Singapore’s wider electricity system, shared financing could be defensible. If benefits accrue predominantly to a commercial buyer, the justification for shifting costs to households or smaller businesses becomes weaker.
The proposed Malaysian connection illustrates the distinction. Benefits to Singapore’s consumers must be assessed separately from those accruing to electricity exporters, transit networks or individual buyers.
Identifying beneficiaries should precede deciding who contributes.
- Third, establish what is already being paid for
The financing debate often focuses on benefits that commercial electricity contracts cannot fully capture. The central question is whether those benefits are already reflected in existing payment arrangements.
Infrastructure may receive revenues through commercial contracts, transmission charges, regulated returns or availability payments. These are possible remuneration mechanisms, not evidence that every arrangement already applies to the projects under consideration.
Multiple revenue streams can be legitimate when they compensate for different services. Before introducing broader support, policymakers should establish which costs and services are already remunerated and which benefits remain uncompensated.
For example, an availability-based payment could compensate an interconnector for maintaining capacity even when electricity is not flowing. Its justification would depend on how it interacts with other revenues and the obligations retained by the operator.
The objective should be a transparent assessment of the remaining justified funding requirement, accounting for existing and proposed remuneration.
A lower price for one buyer is not necessarily a lower cost for the electricity system.
Transferring an infrastructure charge from a commercial contract to a wider customer base may improve that contract’s attractiveness without reducing the resources required to deliver the project.
- Fourth, allocate risks to those best able to manage them
Long-term cross-border infrastructure involves risks that no single participant can eliminate.
Developers and operators can influence construction performance, maintenance and operational availability. Changes in foreign regulation and certain political uncertainties may require government coordination or carefully limited guarantees.
Public backing should preserve incentives for efficient delivery. Guarantees need clear conditions, limits and consequences for underperformance.
Lower financing costs must also be weighed against the exposure assumed by whoever provides the guarantee.
Singapore already has relevant instruments. EMA’s import framework allows consideration of contracts for difference and performance contracts, subject to assessment. Singapore Energy Interconnections provides a vehicle for developing and investing in regional connections.
The earlier mentioned Singapore-US connectivity study, which examined shared ownership, transmission tariffs, guarantees and capacity-based or availability-based revenue models, is expected to release its final report in 2027.
These options make the question of when support is justified increasingly relevant.
Making the case for support visible
Why should households and smaller businesses help finance connections serving large commercial electricity customers?
There can be a legitimate answer, but it requires evidence.
Public participation might reduce overall financing costs or unlock valuable shared infrastructure. Such gains should be distinguished from simply redistributing charges, including the cost of public risk exposure.
For each connection seeking broader support, Singapore should provide a concise public explanation covering the realistic alternative, net additional benefits, beneficiaries, remuneration already considered and risks retained by private parties.
It should also specify when support would be reviewed, reduced or withdrawn.
This need not disclose confidential power purchase agreements or duplicate assessments already undertaken by regulators. A consistent explanation would make financing decisions easier to evaluate and compare.
Regional electricity connectivity requires substantial investment and cooperation. Clear principles can help attract capital while protecting consumers.
Those asked to contribute should be able to see the additional value they are paying for, and why that value has not already been paid for elsewhere.
The writer is an independent commodities and energy markets analyst specialising in agricultural markets, international trade, food security and geopolitical risk
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