Who watches over Nvidia’s chips?

A scandal about Washington, not just one CEO

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    • US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has said that he follows the White House’s lead on chip sales to China.
    • US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has said that he follows the White House’s lead on chip sales to China. PHOTO: REUTERS
    Published Wed, Nov 18, 2026 · 01:03 PM

    FOR two years, the fight over selling artificial intelligence chips to China ran on abstractions: compute thresholds, “fourth-best” chips, market share versus military uplift. In the last three weeks it acquired a plot.

    The events unfolded rapidly. Within 14 days of The New York Times reporting that US agencies had examined whether a businesswoman at Megaspeed, a Singapore-based AI cloud company and major Nvidia customer, was working for Chinese intelligence, Jensen Huang admitted to having an affair with Alice Huang and resigned from the company he co-founded 33 years ago.

    It is tempting to read this as a morality tale about one man. That misses the bigger story. The fight that matters is the one now in the open.

    It involves Washington’s China hawks, Congress, US President Donald Trump’s own Cabinet, and the Commerce Department under Howard Lutnick, which licenses chip exports and keeps the Entity List, the government’s trade blacklist.

    Commerce’s failings

    The hawks’ case rests on a pattern that Commerce has not convincingly explained. Its export-enforcement arm has had Megaspeed in its sights since late 2024.

    The US has imposed chip-export restrictions since 2022, but officials reportedly found Nvidia equipment still boxed at a Malaysian data centre; an affiliated company has since bought at least US$4.8 billion of Nvidia-based gear.

    Other agencies have reportedly urged adding Megaspeed to the Entity List. But the company remains off the list, to which Commerce has, by several counts, added no one in more than 13 months.

    Lutnick reportedly received a classified memo about Jensen Huang’s relationship before Trump’s May trip to Beijing, the same trip during which Commerce cleared about 10 Chinese companies to buy H200s. The exact date that the memo was sent, relative to those approvals, has not been reported.

    What changes the shape of the fight is who is on the other side. According to Axios, Trump approved action against suspected chip diversion at least three times, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in support of the crackdown and Lutnick warning that it would spark a trade war.

    Bessent reportedly asked Lutnick in the Situation Room why Megaspeed wasn’t listed, and Lutnick allegedly said he didn’t know. Commerce denies the exchange took place.

    This is not Democrats against the administration, or Congress against the executive. It is conflict within the administration, with the Treasury, state, defence departments and the trade office against Commerce.

    Commerce’s response

    The US Commerce Department has a few defences for its actions.

    First, Commerce’s chip policy was the president’s policy. In January, Trump chose to allow H200 sales to China in exchange for a 25 per cent cut of the revenue, and Lutnick has repeatedly said that, on Beijing, he follows the White House’s lead.

    Second, the department says it enforces “by the book”, uses the Entity List against bad actors as a matter of routine and closed an AI-chip export loophole in May.

    Third, part of the Megaspeed delay has a procedural explanation: Commerce reportedly paused its own probe at the Justice Department’s request, and listing a target in the middle of a criminal investigation can tip the company off.

    Fourth, the espionage case is unproven. CNN reports that US intelligence is not certain Alice Huang actually spied on Nvidia. Megaspeed says it is a compliant, legal corporation. Beijing calls the allegation groundless. Nvidia’s board states it had no reason to believe US national security or company secrets were compromised.

    Finally, the substantive case for selling, that American chips in Chinese data centres keep China dependent on the US technology stack and deny Huawei customers, is a serious position. It pre-dates this scandal, and the scandal does not refute it.

    Washington’s process failures

    Here is the uncomfortable point for both camps. As a former Commerce official told CNN, Beijing did not need an intelligence operation to get Nvidia lobbying for China sales.

    Jensen Huang argued for them openly and once dismissed the label “China hawk” as a badge of shame. If Alice Huang was an asset, she was pushing on an open door. The spy angle alone does not show that US policy was corrupted.

    But that cuts against Commerce, too. What the scandal exposes is not one compromised executive. It is an export-enforcement agency that appears to have let trade diplomacy override its enforcement tools.

    The unheeded memo, the frozen Entity List, the stalled curbs and the unanswered question in the Situation Room – if the exchange did take place – are arguably process failures.

    They would matter even if Alice Huang turns out to be nothing more than a businesswoman. Trump’s comment that the memo did not make much of an impact on his decision-making process does not help Commerce’s case.

    A person can believe that selling H200s to vetted Chinese buyers is smart policy and also believe that a company under a years-long chip-diversion investigation belongs on the Entity List.

    Those positions are compatible. The administration’s failure to keep them separate, treating every enforcement action as a chip to trade with Beijing, is the real lesson of the Nvidia affair.

    The hawks now have what one analyst called a story with a name and a face. They should resist overclaiming: The espionage is unproven, and the argument for selling chips to China did not begin with Alice Huang.

    But the case against Commerce does not depend on who she was. It depends on whether America’s export-control system works when enforcing it is diplomatically inconvenient. On the record so far, it has not.