The 2026 US midterm elections ended with the Democratic Party regaining control of both houses of Congress. Republicans suffered setbacks not only in traditional battleground constituencies but also lost key seats in their strongholds, including Texas, South Carolina, Kansas and Ohio.

Democrats won the governorships of Ohio and Texas, while the Democratic governor of Pennsylvania, where I live, secured re-election. This was therefore more than a routine midterm defeat for the Republicans; it was a collective expression of voter dissatisfaction with US President Donald J. Trump’s performance in his second term, against a backdrop of shifting voter priorities and demographics.

Trump returned to the White House in the 2024 general election on pledges to crack down on illegal immigration, bring down inflation, revive manufacturing, defend traditional values and keep the US out of war. Two years later, these promises have yet to yield policy results for the average voter. Because Trump has tied the Republican Party’s political fate so closely to his personal leadership style, disappointment with the president’s policies has turned into dissatisfaction with the party as a whole.

Cultural issues cannot displace concerns over the economy and living costs

Over the past few years, Trump and the Republican Party have also used opposition to gender diversity and transgender rights, alongside the defence of traditional family values, as key tools for mobilising grassroots voters. However, a Pew Research Center survey released in October showed that these were no longer top priorities for most voters. Only 23% of registered voters said policies concerning LGBTQ people were “very important” to their voting decisions. By contrast, 84% said the economy was very important, while 59% said the same of immigration. In other words, cultural issues can still rally support, but they struggle to displace the economy and living costs as voters’ foremost concerns.

On the economy, reviving American manufacturing is a central pillar of Trump’s economic nationalism. He has sought to use tariffs, industrial subsidies and supply-chain restructuring to encourage companies to move production back to the US. Yet reshoring manufacturing takes more than investment announcements or higher tariffs. Research released by IoT Analytics in May showed that US manufacturing construction spending had generally trended downwards since 2024, with spending on electronics and semiconductor factories falling 44% from its mid-2024 peak. Excluding electronics, manufacturing construction spending has risen since the tariffs took effect, but not nearly enough to constitute an investment boom. A manufacturing revival also faces structural constraints, including high US labour costs and a shortage of skilled workers.

The pressures voters feel directly are inflation and rising energy prices. Trump had promised to curb inflation, lower energy costs and keep the US out of war. But the outbreak and prolonged course of the US-Iran war, together with persistent disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, have directly driven up US petrol prices. According to Fortune magazine, the average price of petrol in the US reached US$4.15 a gallon on election day, nearly 40% higher than before the Iran war began. Where I live, petrol costs US$4.60 a gallon — a price I have never seen since coming to the US to study and settle down in 2000 — directly pushing up living expenses across the board. Some highly educated Americans I have spoken to, who are relatively more globally aware, have praised China’s longstanding policy of stockpiling crude oil while using new energy sources to replace petroleum products. A Reuters post-election report on 4 November noted that nearly nine in ten voters said living costs were an important or decisive factor in their voting decisions, while nearly two-thirds blamed Trump for high prices.

Illegal immigration was one of the most powerful rallying cries of Trump’s 2024 campaign. The American public has long supported stronger border controls, but support for border control does not mean support for every form of immigration enforcement. A survey early this year by the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research at the University of Chicago found that 62% of American adults believed Trump had gone too far in deploying federal immigration enforcement officers to US cities. Surveys by Pew and other organisations also reflected growing public dissatisfaction with the methods used by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The central problem is that tough enforcement is no longer confined to targeting serious criminals. Instead, it has sparked widespread controversy over the treatment of undocumented immigrant families, particularly children and long-term residents, as well as enforcement procedures, eroding the Republicans’ previous political advantage on immigration.

From my experience of living in the US, illegal immigration primarily affects areas bordering Mexico, such as California and Texas. Many Americans living in the Midwest and along the East Coast generally do not feel its direct impact. In fact, undocumented immigrants provide low-cost labour while seeking legal status and awaiting adjustments to their immigration status, lowering living costs for the existing population. This has long been a tacitly accepted grey area in American society.

This election also revealed noteworthy ethnic and generational patterns. Many Latino voters who shifted to the Democrats had initially supported stronger border controls, but later opposed excessive enforcement within the US.

An Associated Press survey of more than 100,000 voters showed that about 60% of Latino voters supported Democratic House candidates this year, compared with about one-third who backed Republicans. Support for Democratic candidates among black voters reached about 90%, with particularly strong support among black men. Young voters, meanwhile, swung clearly back towards the Democrats. The Associated Press’s post-election survey also showed that about 70% of voters under 30 supported Democratic House candidates, whereas this age group had been roughly evenly split between Trump and Kamala Harris in 2024. This autumn’s Youth Poll by Harvard Kennedy School found widespread concern among young voters about living costs, corruption and their economic prospects. Among respondents aged 18 to 29, 48% were concerned about economic fairness and social justice and supported considering the introduction of some “socialist” elements into the US economy. Support was also relatively strong for policies such as a wealth tax and universal healthcare.

In my view, this “blue wave” signals a shift in US voters’ priorities: away from correcting what they saw as the Democratic Party’s overly left-wing policies and returning to domestic nationalism, and towards a more immediate concern with what they have actually gained under Republican rule. Dissatisfaction with excessive enforcement during the deportation of undocumented immigrants has also outweighed earlier resentment towards illegal immigration. Meanwhile, a growing number of young voters are scrutinising the Republican Party’s conservative ideology.

The writer is a US-based historian and current affairs commentator.